I can’t tell you how many times I’ve seen contracts for ground software engineering misallocated—won by companies whose primary, and often only, domain expertise is in Command and Control (C2) or Mission Management. Across vast government contracts and burgeoning commercial ventures, a clear, unmistakable signal screams that the space industry has an existential problem in its understanding and scoping of these technical issues. Failure to correct this systemic flaw is a guarantee of perpetual financial drain, engineering insolvency, and ultimately, a betrayal of the industry’s potential.
First, let’s establish an undeniable truth: Satellite Operations is not the same as Ground Systems Software. Yes, historically, “Ground Systems” was a monolithic term encompassing everything from Monitoring and Control (M&C) to Payload Data Processing. But that overly broad scope is the root of the crisis. Expertise in C2 and ground station integration does not confer knowledge of the hard problems that lie in building and accessing fault-tolerant, high-availability data networks.
Access… that is the critical choke point. C2 and Mission Management are focused on the satellite’s daily health. But they are entirely dependent on the underlying access to high-quality data pipes. This is akin to confusing a smart home’s user app with the underlying electrical grid. Building and maintaining each are fundamentally different problem sets that demand different, highly specific domain knowledge.
Let’s put this in software design terms—the language of scalable engineering. Great software has a strong separation of concerns. Each module must do one thing, and one thing only. When a single component is overloaded with responsibilities, it becomes overly complex, bloated, and unmaintainable. The result is fragile, expensive software that is impossible to sustain.
Right now, ground software suffers from catastrophic separation of concerns, and the entire SATCOM ecosystem is poised to pay the price. If a satellite operator chooses one C2 provider, that provider will inevitably have to become a secondary expert in ground station integration, forcing them to maintain those interfaces and unify all vendors under a single, complex common layer. This costly, duplicative integration is repeated by nearly every C2 provider across the industry. Satellite operators are forced to become masters of two distinct, highly technical verticals—satellite operations and ground systems engineering.
The most damaging effect of this structural failure is the exclusion of genuine ground systems domain expertise from the primary decision-making process on large-scale programs. By defaulting to a C2-centric contract, critical architectural decisions are made without the input of the companies whose core business is building and maintaining the utility-grade infrastructure—the ground network, hardware orchestration, data backhaul, and software to tie it together. This knowledge deficit is precisely why the resulting systems are poorly designed, monolithic, and suffer from the catastrophic separation of concerns that guarantees future engineering insolvency and high maintenance costs. Programs will continue to produce fragile, expensive software until a dedicated ground systems company is treated as a necessary, first-tier technical partner.
This is beyond separation of concerns; it’s engineering malpractice. Government and commercial entities must change their views and embrace a modern, clean architecture. The separation is clear: the responsibilities on the left represent a complex, utility-grade software vertical—demanding expertise in distributed systems, real-time data processing, and large-scale global automation.